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The Dixit-Stiglitz model is extended by the possibility for ￿rms to un-
dertake process innovation. The model can provide a new explanation to
describe the relationship that research activity of ￿rms is positively corre-
lated with product market competition at low levels of competition, and
negatively at high levels that has been found in the data. The initial pos-
itive relationship is caused by an increased business stealing opportunity
with more competition, while the negative e￿ect comes from the reduc-
tion of the markup due to higher competition (measured as elasticity of
substitution). Also the ambiguous relationship of market entry barriers
with respect to research activity is discussed using a less general form of
the model. This framework may also be used to explain the inverted-U
relationship found between competition and advertising expenditures.
JEL classi￿cation: L10, O3
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11 Introduction
Joseph Schumpeter [1943] is today associated with the idea, that ￿rms should be
allowed to exercise some market power to increase their incentive to innovate.
Ever since the relationship between innovation and competition intensity of
￿rms has created large interest in the literature. Despite vast recent progress
in the empirical understanding of this question, the debate is far from being
settled theoretically.1 The main contribution of this paper is to suggest a new
explanation for the observed empirical regularity of an inverted-U.
Already Dasgupta and Stiglitz [1980] summarized the ambiguous empirical
￿ndings that "up to a point industrial concentration is positively correlated
with innovation activity, it is negatively correlated when an industry is too
concentrated" (page 266). Given this observation, which largely rests on the
work of Scherer [1970], a recent paper by Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Gri￿th and
Howitt [2005a] (furthermore ABBGH) suggested that empirically there may be
an inverted-U relationship between the Lerner index (to measure the intensity
of product market competition) and patents (as a measure of innovation). Ac-
cording to this hypothesis, the highest researching markets will be those that
provide some market competition while still letting ￿rms exercise a certain de-
gree of market power. Other studies have presented evidence which con￿rms
this ￿nding for various datasets (for example Hashmi [2008]), and as well on
industry level as on ￿rm level (for a ￿rm level investigation see for example
Carlin et al. [2004], and a ￿rm level case study for the automotive industry Van
Biesebroeck and Hashmi [2007]).
In their paper ABBGH provide a theoretical explanation in the framework
of two ￿rms and three possible interrelations. A ￿rm may either be innovation
leader or follower, or ￿rms may be on par. In their model increasing competition
reduces the pro￿ts of ￿rms on equal level of innovation, which has two e￿ects:
On the one hand it raises the incentive to "escape competition", to get ahead of
ones competitors when ￿rms are on equal level of innovation. On the other hand
a follower has less incentive to catch up with the leader, since in the resulting
state of equal innovation level the pro￿ts are less. The decreasing mechanism
is called the "Schumpeterian e￿ect of competition". In their model the positive
and negative e￿ect described balance each other in such a way that for some
1One of many good overviews of the theoretical debate on the relationship of industrial
organization and innovative activity is given by Vives [2006], who also demonstrates that for
Cournot and Bertrand markets a positive relationship should be expected.
2parameters they indeed generate the inverted-U pattern.
Some empirical doubt has been cast on this model by Hashmi [2008] who
found this inverted-U relationship to be robust in the data, but who rejected
some other predictions of the ABBGH model. Particularly he found in the data
that "it is possible that the relationship between competition and innovation
is inverted-U regardless of the technology gap" (page 17), while the described
"escape competition" e￿ect is only sensible in markets in which ￿rms are close
in levels of technology.
In search for an additional explanation I introduce process innovation into
a Dixit Stiglitz setting. This model of monopolistic competition is appealing
because it creates a competitive environment for ￿rms while still letting them
exercise some market power. As Paul Krugman observed: "This framework,
while admittedly special, is remarkably powerful in its ability to yield simple
intuition-building treatments of seemingly intractable issues" (Krugman [1991]).
This paper is written in the same spirit.
Some other attempts have already been made to analyze process innova-
tion in the Dixit Stiglity framework. Some ￿st steps into this direction have
been undertaken for example by Montagna [1995] and Melitz [2003], who have
demonstrated the workings of the model using a certain form of heterogene-
ity in marginal costs. An example of a model using process innovation in this
setting has been brought forward by G￿tz [1999] and by Ederington and Mc-
Calman [2008], who study the timing of innovation and technological di￿usion
in a related framework.
A further related work is the dissertation of Georg G￿tz [1996], who derives a
related model involving a binary research decision of ￿rms. G￿tz found a similar
relationship between competition and innovation on aggregate market level. I
extend his model by allowing ￿rms to have continuous innovation e￿orts. In
this generalized version of the model from G￿tz I can show that theoretically
an inverted-U relationship may be found on ￿rm level as well (as found by the
authors mentioned above in the data). Further I will analyze the reaction of the
innovative activity of ￿rms with respect to the ￿xed costs.
Another attempt has been brought forward by Aghion and Gri￿th [2005b],
who have analyzed the relationship between product innovation and competi-
tion in the Dixit Stiglitz model. They interpret product innovation to be equal
to the number of ￿rms in the market. They come to the conclusion that in the
Dixit Stiglitz model "product market competition [...] reduces post-entry rents
and therefore discourages entry (or innovation)" (page 12). I do not restrict
3innovation to describe solely the entry of new ￿rms, but focus on process in-
novation. My results show that in fact, despite innovation forcing some ￿rms
to leave the market, cost reducing technologies may occur. The relationship of
innovation and competition can have increasing and decreasing parts, and under
fairly general assumptions the pattern will be of an inverted-U shape.
The model derived in the following pages unfolds as follows: At ￿rst ￿rms
with identical cost structures form the stable Dixit Stiglitz equilibrium. At one
point ￿rms simultaneously get the possibility to invest in a new cost reducing
technology (innovate). Each ￿rm maximizes its pro￿ts by choosing its inno-
vation level and its prices before and after innovation. Additionally each ￿rm
has to form believes on the innovative activity of its competitors to determine
its optimal innovation level. Doing so they can anticipate the unique Nash
equilibrium of zero pro￿ts net of innovation costs.
The inverted-U found is created due to di￿erent reasons than in the paper
by ABBGH. Their "escape competition" e￿ect is not present in my model,
and such incentives don’t exist. Even without modeling such an e￿ect, the
inverted-U relationship on ￿rm and market level can be found in my model, in
which the increasing part is alternatively explained by a greater business stealing
opportunity with more innovation. In a market with large substitutability one
￿rm can attract customers from the other ￿rms by reducing its price, which is
less e￿ective in a market with little or no competition. 2
The decreasing part of the inverted-U is due to the same Schumpeterian
e￿ect of competition like in the model by ABBGH: Tough competition reduces
the markup of ￿rms, and therefore the post-innovation rents.
To demonstrate the low innovation incentive at the extremes, consider the
extremes: In markets with tough competition the ￿rms operate close to the
margin and can hardly generate pro￿ts. In the Dixit Stiglitz environment this
will also be true for post-innovation pro￿ts, which reduces the incentive to un-
dertake expensive research e￿orts. If on the other hand competition is low, the
￿rms do not feel the pressure from substitution, and serve one market segment
with large room for pricing ￿exibility. Innovation and the resulting price cuts
in such markets will not attract much additional demand, which makes cost
2The idea of a business stealing e￿ect has been expressed in other contexts for example
by Aghion and Howitt [1992], Grossman and Helpman [1991], Segerstrom [1998]. In a more
similar context the idea has been expressed by Raith [2003]. In these models an innovator
can fully crowd out a competitor by innovating. The business stealing e￿ect described here
di￿ers, since undercutting other ￿rms will not necessarily drive them out of the market, but
just decrease their demand.
4reductions less valuable to ￿rms.
While elements of this understanding of the problem have been suggested in
the literature3, the model combines these to create a compact framework that
generates the inverted-U pattern.
This paper is organized as follows: After stating the assumptions of the
model, a general version of it is derived. After the discussion of some properties
(most noteworthy the conditions to ￿nd an inverted-U), the model is solved
using an example for a particular innovation function. Further it is shown that
the model could be also interpreted as a model of advertising. A conclusion
concludes.
2 The model
The framework in which I study innovation is an extension of the Dixit Stiglitz
model of monopolistic competition, which is additionally extended by the option
for ￿rms to undertake process innovation. Like in their model, the aggregated
demand from consumers follows a CES utility function. Let xi denote the total
quantity of good i that is consumed, and  be an exogenous parameter. Then













It is assumed that 0 <  < 1, which ensures that the goods are substitutes. If
 approaches one, the demand function becomes linear in xi, and the goods be-
come perfect substitutes. A reduction of  reduces the willingness of consumers
to substitute one good for the other. It follows that  is a parameter that can
be used to smoothly adjust competition in this model. Another possibility to
adjust competition would be to change the number of ￿rms; given however that
in this model the number of ￿rms is endogenous, I will use the parameter  as
the parameter to adjust competition, and interpret changes of  as changes of
competition. Also the Lerner index, which was used in the ABBGH paper and
others to measure competition, is in this model a function of  only. The case of
3For example Vives (2006) has found that the relationship between the elasticity of sub-
stitution and process innovation should be positive in Cournot and Bertrand settings. Raith
(2003) showed that with more elastic ￿rm - level demand functions there is a greater business
stealing opportunity (page 1246).
5changing barriers to entry (a change of the ￿xed costs f) will also be discussed
later.
Further I assume that the total consumer income is I in every period, and
that in each period the full amount of income is spent on the consumption
goods x. It may be argued that the assumption of constant income is in this
context overly restrictive, since it is widely believed that innovation increases
income. But innovation does still increase the relative income in this model
despite assumption two, since it lowers prices and with a ￿xed income therefore
increases purchasing power. Also the constancy of income is not crucial to the
result; the model could be modi￿ed in a way to increase I directly in the post-
innovation equilibrium. If this increase is not assumed to be too large, the shape
of the competition - innovation relationship and all the qualitative predictions
would stay the same (only the numerical results would shift as a consequence,
if the model is solved using an explicit cost function). 4
In the initial equilibrium, the cost function of ￿rms is fully characterized by
a ￿xed cost f and a variable cost c, which are both constant for all ￿rms in the
initial innovation. Innovation can then serve to lower the marginal cost, in the
following way: A one time research investment of !i today lowers the marginal
costs of ￿rm i from c to c(!i) in the future. Innovation thus only a￿ects the
per-unit production costs and not the entry to market. It can be thought of as
the purchase of new machines, which work faster than the ones they replace but
also require a one time investment. It is this assumption by which the model
discussed here di￿ers from the Dixit-Stiglitz model.
It is reasonable to assume that a cost reducing investment (a process in-
novation) of ! should have the following relationship with marginal costs c:
c(!i) > 0, c
0
(!i) < 0 and c
00
(!i) > 0. This description requires that marginal
costs will always be positive, decrease as a consequence of research e￿ort, but
this decrease happens at a declining rate; the impact of the marginal dollar
spent on research is smaller the larger the research e￿ort. An example of the
form c(!i) = 1=!i (which is one of the most simple functions to ful￿ll these
three properties) is derived later.
Hence there are three cost elements that a ￿rm faces: marginal costs c(!i),
which are initially identical for all ￿rms, but can be lowered, ￿xed costs f, which
are constant in all every period. Finally a ￿rm has the option to pay research
costs !i, which have to be paid once and are sunk costs thereafter.
4Since the assumption will be made that the number of ￿rms is large, such an increase of
income due to innovation would be of little strategic relevance to one single ￿rm.
6In this model, innovation may also be thought of as producing a higher qual-
ity variety after a one time investment while leaving marginal costs unchanged.
Another possible view of the model would be, to interpret it as a model of
advertising. The interpretation of the model as a model of advertising will be
developed below.
Next I assume that the number of ￿rms is large. This assumption may
be restated such that ￿rms ignore the impact of their price on the income of
consumers (whose purchasing power changes as a result of a price change).
This assumption is necessary to justify a certain Dixit Stiglitz simpli￿cation
when computing the price elasticity. See also the derivation of equation 3 in the
appendix. Finally, there is free entry to the market at any point in time, which
validates the use of a zero pro￿ts condition.
3 Equilibrium
First I will derive the initial Dixit Stiglitz equilibrium, then analyze the innova-
tion incentive, and then analyze the new stable equilibrium and the conditions
under which it will be observed. For most of the following equations a more
detailed derivation is given in the appendix. From the utility function and the
income of the consumers follows, that the optimal demand for good xi is fully













From this result, and the assumption on the cost structure follows the op-
timal pricing strategy of a monopolist, using further the assumption that the
number of ￿rms is large. Initially all ￿rms have the same constant marginal





Combining equation 2, equation 3, and the zero pro￿t condition which must
hold given that free entry is assumed, the number of ￿rms in the initial equilib-





So far these results follow Dixit Stiglitz [1977]. Now the model is extended by
the introduction of the possibility to innovate, which implies also an extension
to two periods. Let n1 denote the number of ￿rms that will be selling a positive
quantity in the new equilibrium (in the second period). Let further r denote
the constant interest rate at which ￿rms can obtain credit. Then the pro￿ts of






















will be called the innovation index. The
innovative activity of ￿rm j in￿uences the pro￿t of ￿rm i only through this
innovation index, and it does so negatively. This externality of research is cap-
turing the negative side of the business stealing e￿ect; the loss of consumers due
to rivals research activities. This e￿ect also mathematically operates through
demand (compare with equation 2).
The maximization problem of this pro￿t function with respect to !i may
not yield a positive solution for !i. In this case no innovation would take place.
Given the assumptions that c(!i) > 0 and c
0
(!i) < 0, as can be observed from
the ￿rst order condition of this problem, the solution for !i will be unique,
provided that it is positive for all values of .
This feature is visible in ￿gure 1, which shows this pro￿t function for a ￿rm
versus its research e￿ort, taking the behavior of the other ￿rms as exogenously
given. The innovation function used is the one from the special case presented
later as an example. For all values of  larger than one half this function will
look similar, for the values of  less then half it has just the single peak without
the initial decline.
The innovation index of the initial equilibrium is equal to nc

 1. Given the
free entry assumption the innovation index can never be smaller than that in
the new equilibrium. If it were, the entry of non-innovators would increase the
index. Hence the equilibrium innovation index can only be greater or equal to
the original one. Thus the number of ￿rms in the new equilibrium n1 must be
less or equal to the number of ￿rms in the initial equilibrium n. Due to this
negative externality from innovation in this model (the business stealing e￿ect),
8some ￿rms may be forced to leave the market. Also due to the zero pro￿t
condition in the initial equilibrium all non innovators will be driven out of the
market if the innovation index is greater than the one of the initial equilibrium,
since at this initial value ￿rms just break even.
In equation 5 the positive and the two negative e￿ects of competition (mea-
sured by ) on pro￿ts are visible. On the one hand an increase of  decreases the
markup (1 ). This is what has been called earlier the Schumpeterian compe-
tition e￿ect. On the other hand the exponent of c(!i) will be more negative as
a consequence of an increase of . Hence the impact of a reduction of marginal
costs on pro￿ts is larger, and a decrease of costs more valuable to ￿rms. This
second e￿ect comes from the fact that price di￿erences result in larger business
stealing possibilities if competition is tougher. If a good has many close substi-
tutes, a price reduction of that good results in a larger increase in demand as
compared to the situation when there are no substitutes.
When deciding how much to innovate, each ￿rm can only in￿uence its own





 1 be the innovation index of all ￿rms but innovating ￿rm i.










































  1 = 0 (7)
As demonstrated in the appendix, a su￿cient condition for the second order
derivative to be smaller than zero is that c(!i) > 0, c
00
(!i) > 0, c
0
(!i) < 0
and n1 > maxf1;2g. The three conditions on the cost function are reasonable
qualities, and when describing the assumptions of the model the cost function
was de￿ned to have these properties. The requirement on the number of ￿rms
to be large is not restrictive by assumptions. Hence the solution to equation 6
will be a maximum in all feasible situations.
To come to a proper solution ￿rm i must form beliefs on the innovation of
the other ￿rms (the value of V ). Given the initial symmetry of ￿rms and the
9unique solution to the problem of maximizing ￿rm pro￿ts with respect to !i
(provided that this solution is positive), ￿rm i can anticipate that other ￿rms
who face the identical maximization problem will come to the same solution like
itself. Analogue to the usual derivation of the Cournot equilibrium, a symmetry
condition on the ￿rst order condition derived can be imposed. Then a ￿rm can
anticipate that V = (n1 1)c(!i)

 1, where again n1 is the number of ￿rms that
will be present in the new equilibrium. Let ! be the optimal research e￿ort in














A second condition that can be anticipated is that in the emerging equilib-
rium the free entry will again lead to the abolishment of positive pro￿ts. As
shown before, each innovator reduces the pro￿ts of the other ￿rms. If expected
pro￿ts after innovation are greater than zero there would be money left on the
table and more ￿rms would innovate. Each innovator reduces the expected
pro￿ts after innovation, in the evolving Nash equilibrium pro￿ts are equal to
zero.
If too many ￿rms innovate, pro￿ts including research costs may be negative.
In this case ￿rms may still decide to stay in the market, since research costs are
sunk, and in every following period the ￿xed costs may be covered by sales. Ex
post the innovation decision is not optimal in this case. Hence pro￿ts including
research costs in the new equilibrium will be less or equal to zero. Despite
having a possible solution with negative long run pro￿ts, the only relevant ex
ante assumption is that innovating ￿rms assume long run pro￿ts to be exactly
equal to zero, since no ￿rm would innovate given expected negative pro￿ts.
From the pro￿t function 5, noting again that V = (n1  1)c(!i)

 1 this zero










The situation described by condition 8 and condition 9 de￿nes the unique
Nash equilibrium in two equations with two unknowns (the research e￿ort !
and the endogenous number of ￿rms n1), which determine the equilibrium of
the model. These equations can be solved once a particular form of the cost
function c(!i) is assumed. One example is given later in this paper.
10For the equilibrium to be valid, it has to be veri￿ed that the new innovation
index is larger than the old one. If that was not the case, non-innovating ￿rms
would enter the market, thereby increasing the innovation index, until it reaches
the initial level. For this condition to hold, certain parameter values have to be
excluded. At these parameters, no innovation will take place. This condition
can not be stated for the general case, but will be derived for an explicit solution
of this model later.
4 Equilibrium Properties
The inverted-U on ￿rm level: There are several ways to measure compe-
tition (Boone et al. 2007). As noted before, in this paper the elasticity of
substitution  is interpreted to measure competition. The same interpretation
of  is found often in the literature; among others by ABBGH, who write in the
footnote on page 710: "Increased product market competition is modeled [...]
as an increase in the substitutability between di￿erentiated products in Dixit
and Stiglitz [1977]."
As can easily be veri￿ed, the Lerner index to measure market power is given
by (1   ), and hence depends directly and only on . The Lerner index was
also the number used to measure competition in the empirical investigation of
ABBGH in which the inverted-U was described and in many other studies.
For this reason the relationship between ! and  is analyzed further. Dif-












































n1   1   







This equation gives the impact of a change in competition on innovation,
thus it describes the relationship of interest. If it is positive for a small value of
11, and negative for a large value of it, its form can be described as an inverted-U.
The ￿rst observation is that when  approaches 1, this equation will be
negative for all parameter values. If  approaches to 1 the second fraction
converges to (n1 2)=(n1 2) = 1 if c
0
is not equal to zero, which was assumed.
The fraction in brackets is always positive, hence the equation is indeed negative
as  approaches 1.
By assumption 4 it should hold for all valid parameters that n1 > 2. Then









Equation 11 is ful￿lled for all cost functions of the form c(!) = !x with x
being a negative number (the model will be solved for the case of x =  1 next),
for  log(x) and also for a large number of other functions.
Hence given equation 11 holds for all values of !, the relationship between
innovation and competition can be expected to be increasing in the area of
 = 0, and decreasing in the area of  = 1, with a single change of slope in
between. If parameter restrictions don’t cut o￿ the maximum, this would result
in the observation of what could be called an inverted-U.
If condition 11 is not ful￿lled at all feasible values of  then the relationship
of competition and innovation will be decreasing only. The interpretation of
this ￿nding is, that the slope is so steep (the cost reduction as a consequence of
an increase of ! is so high), that this reduction outweights the negative e￿ect
of little competition.
It may be with some functions c(!) that equation 11 holds in the area of
 = 0 (note that ! depends on ), but not for all possible values of . Then
the relationship may be characterized by more than one change of direction. It
would still be increasing at the minimal and decreasing at the maximal value of
, but could be of a shape that changes the sign of the slope more than once in
between.
The inverted-U relationship on ￿rm level is shown with varying I in ￿gure
2 and with varying f in ￿gure 3 for the situation of the example analyzed in
the next section. The inverted-U pattern is clearly visible. An increase of I
will ceteris paribus unambiguously increase research e￿ort, while the role of an
increase of f is less clear. This role is discussed shortly later in this section.
The inverted-U on market level: Also the joint output of ￿rms will
12follow this inverted-U pattern. This is shown in ￿gure 4. Market research e￿ort
in this graph is measured as the number of ￿rms ( n) times the research output
of one ￿rm (!). This feature is similar to the one described by G￿tz [1996]
in his dissertation, who found the same result in a related model with a binary
choice for innovation of ￿rms.
The role of f: The parameter f describes the ￿xed costs of ￿rms, and
hence also the market entry barriers. In the model developed in this paper, the
e￿ect of a variation of entry barriers on innovation is ambiguous. This can be
seen directly in equation 9, which holds for general research functions.
The ￿rst observation which follows from this equation is that the partial
derivative @!=@f =  (1 + r) 1, which is strictly smaller than zero. This
observation simply acknowledges that ￿xed costs and research costs can be sub-
stituted one for the other to make the zero pro￿ts condition hold, and that
hence a ￿xed cost increase would tend to reduce research activity.
However, there are more e￿ects at work. The second observation from this
equation is that also the derivative @!=@n1 =  (1+r) 1(1 )I=n1
2 is smaller
than zero. Hence a partial increase of the number of ￿rms will decrease the
research activity of each ￿rm. If there are less ￿rms they can spread the research
costs over a larger base, and hence have an incentive to innovate more.
In the general setting n1 can not explicitly be stated. Given however that f
is the barrier to market entry, it can be assumed that an increase of the market
entry fee f leads to an equilibrium consisting of less ￿rms. Therefore @n1=@f
should also be smaller than zero. In the example given in the next section this
is clearly the case, and it should be expected in general for sensible parameters.
Since @!=@n1 < 0 and @n1=@f < 0, there is also a positive e￿ect of f on
the research activity of ￿rms via its in￿uence on the number of ￿rms. The e￿ect
from lowering or raising the entry barriers for ￿rms to access a certain market on
the research activity of ￿rms operating in that market can thus be ambiguous.
The intuition is that on the one hand an increase of entry barriers will
create less and therefore larger ￿rms that can more easily a￿ord large research
spendings, but on the other hand increase the costs of these ￿rms and hence
make the zero pro￿ts condition harder to comply.
A graphical representation of this relationship is given for the example ana-
lyzed in ￿gure 3. The lines intersect, which means that ceteris paribus it is not
clear if an increase of f will increase or reduce the research output of a given
￿rm. Examples for both e￿ects can easily be constructed using ￿gure 3.
Another representation is given in ￿gure 5, where f is drawn on the hor-
13izontal axis, and the research output on the vertical one, allowing to see the
variation of research output with respect to f in greater detail. Also this rela-
tionship seems to be best described as an inverted-U for the assumptions and
parameters in the example used. Hence in the case of this example, there is a
single entry barrier that maximizes ￿rms research output.
Welfare: Innovation in this model has two impacts on utility. On the one
hand it lowers costs, and therefor prices, which bene￿ts consumers. On the
other hand it reduces the number of ￿rms and hence reduces the number of
varieties. It is therefor interesting to compare the utility of the two equilibria.
This comparison yields, that the utility is higher in the situation allowing process






This is exactly comparing the old and the new innovation index, utility
will be larger if the innovation index is. But as established before, the new
innovation index can not be smaller than the initial one, since otherwise non-
innovators have an incentive to enter the market. Their entry would increase
the innovation index until it reaches the initial level. Hence in all situations in
which innovation takes place, it will do so to the bene￿t of the consumers.
The market solution need not be socially optimal, and can di￿er from the
choice of a social planner. For example for certain non-convex cost functions
c(!) the social planner decision need not yield a symmetrical solution. If the














The partial derivative with respect to ! yields, that a social planner would
determine the research e￿ort per ￿rm according to  c(!)
0
= 1=(1 + r). This
can be larger or smaller or identical to the market solution. The number of
￿rms and the quantity of good produced can vary accordingly. Hence only for a
speci￿c set of parameters the market solution is socially optimal, and generally
it is not.
145 An example
In this section I will assume that c(!i) = minfc;c=!ig. This means that for ex-
ample a research investment by a ￿rm of 2 allows that ￿rm to halve its marginal
costs. Obviously under this assumption the optimal innovation e￿ort can only
be a value larger than one if it is positive, or zero otherwise.
Combining the equilibrium conditions 8 and 9 gives a quadratic equation for
the number of ￿rms n1, that always has a positive and a negative solution. Since
the number of ￿rms can not be negative, only the positive solution is relevant.






1   2 +
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Just like in the initial equilibrium, the number of ￿rms depends on the ratio
of consumer income over ￿xed cost. The corresponding research e￿ort of one
￿rm is also unique, and given by the following equation (which is also shown








(1   2)2 +
4f
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1   2 +
q





Partial derivatives show that a higher interest rate has a negative e￿ect on
innovation e￿ort, which is expected given the assumptions. An increase of the
income of the consumer income will increase the research e￿ort, which should
also be expected. Finally the already discussed ambiguous e￿ect of the ￿xed
costs f on research e￿ort is clearly visible in this equation. In the equation as
presented, f shows up three times. An increase of the ￿rst f has a positive
e￿ect on !, while an increase of the other two fs has a negative e￿ect. The









For any ! this relationship will be positive if f is small. Hence in markets
with low entry barriers an increase of them will increase the research output
15of the remaining ￿rms. For larger values of f the relationship may become
negative.
Innovation as described will not take place for all possible parameters. The
new innovation index has to be larger than the old one for this solution to hold.
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If equation 15 is ful￿lled, additionally it must hold that ! has to be larger
than one. This comes from the de￿nition of the research function. Equilibria
which predict a research e￿ort of less then one have to be ruled out, which
requires additionally



















+ 2   1
: (17)
The condition on f is not overly restrictive given that r is small. It is
also ful￿lled for all values of   1=2. The threshold of I is potentially large,
particularly if f is large, but this is in line with assumption four that the number
of ￿rms in the initial equilibrium n = (1   )I=f is large.
If condition 15 is an equality, non-innovating ￿rms may survive. Then all
￿rms assume that the new innovation index will equal the initial one. If in this
case too few ￿rms innovate, pro￿ts would still be zero for the innovators. A new
equilibrium consisting of both, innovating and non-innovating ￿rms could estab-
lish. For all other parameters for which innovation takes place, non-innovators
will be forced to leave the market, given the increase of the innovation index.
For this example the inverted-U, and how it changes with I or f is graphically
presented in ￿gures 2 and 3, market research e￿ort is given in ￿gure 4.
166 A note on advertising
In the introduction it was already remarked that advertising could be mod-
eled in a similar way like process innovation is described in this model, and
that hence this model may be alternatively interpreted as a model of advertis-
ing. Process innovation as interpreted here and throughout the literature allows
￿rms to lower production costs permanently after a one time payment. An in-
terpretation for advertising could be, that it allows ￿rms to increase demand in
every period through the payment of a certain sum (denoted by C( )) in every
period. Thus C( ) denotes the per period advertising expenditure of a ￿rm,
and   is a parameter, to adjust how consumers react to it.
To model the e￿ect of   in this model, one possibility to model advertising




the case of process innovation, which was analyzed so far, a ￿rm can increase
the demand for its product linearly by paying C( ) with   > 1. Hence a
payment of   would raise utility and further also demand. Solving the consumer

















The price elasticity stays the same, and also the ￿rm pricing condition, which
will be independent of  . Then the cost of an advertising ￿rm can be expressed
as C( ), whereby it is assumed that advertising costs have to be paid every
period to achieve a permanent e￿ect (contrary to research expenditures, which














  f   C( )
1
A (19)
The function C( ) denotes the cost from advertising an amount   in every
period. If the costs of advertising are thought to be similar to the way in which
costs to innovation were modeled, this equation is mathematically equivalent
to equation 6. Hence this model could also be used to predict an inverted-U
relationship between competition and advertising. In the same way the model
may also be interpreted as a model of increased product quality, which could
also be thought of as leading to an increased demand as a consequence of some
17investment.
Indeed some evidence for an inverted U-relationship between advertising and
competition has been found in the data. First Sutton [1974] found empirically
"support for the inverted-U hypothesis" (page 62) between competition and
advertising. More recently Lee [2002] remarked on the literature on the rela-
tionship between advertising and competition that it has become conventional
wisdom to assume "the so called inverted U hypothesis, which implies that
moderately concentrated industries engage more intensively in advertising than
both atomistically competitive and highly concentrated industries" (page 89).
Further also he con￿rmed this inverted-U relationship between competition and
advertising in consumer good industries.
Hence a second testable prediction of the model described (that we should
expect an inverted-U relationship between innovation and advertising) is con-
￿rmed by empirical investigations of the subject.
7 Conclusion
In this paper a model is presented that provides an alternative explanation for
the observed inverted-U relationship between product market competition and
innovation. It is derived on the basis of the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model. The
model predicts that ceteris paribus markets with medium competition should ex-
hibit a tendency to create more innovation than those markets on the extremes.
For a large general set of innovation functions this result holds theoretically for
￿rm level innovation as well as for aggregate innovation activity.
The increasing part of this inverted-U is explained by a larger business
stealing e￿ect (the possibility to attract consumers from opponents by low-
ering costs), which is higher in markets with more competition. The decreasing
part is explained by the common "Schumpeterian e￿ect of competition", which
states that more competition decreases post-innovation monopoly rents.
The ambiguous relationship of innovation with respect to market entry bar-
riers is discussed using an explicit research function. While in markets with low
entry barriers an increase of these barriers should raise the innovation e￿ort of
￿rms, the e￿ect may be opposite in markets that already have large barriers to
entry.
Hence the model suggests a new hypothesis to understand the empirical
regularity of an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation.
18Additionally the model can also be used to explain the inverted-U hypothesis
found between product market competition and advertising expenditures.
Further it provides a new compact framework to study the e￿ect of various
policies a￿ecting market competition on innovative activity and advertising in
those markets.
Possible further extensions may analyze the case with less restrictive as-
sumptions on the symmetry of ￿rms, for example by introducing heterogeneity
in marginal costs. The results may look similar, with an indi￿erent ￿rm that
has zero pro￿ts after innovation, but with other ￿rms that operate with lower
marginal costs and can generate positive pro￿ts. Also the model may be ex-
tended to overcome the static nature and have a more dynamic structure with
innovation in di￿erent periods.
8 Appendix 1: Derivations and Proofs
Derivation of equation 2: In this model, the budget constraint is given by
P
j xjpj  I. The utility maximization problem yields then the following rela-
tionship between any two goods consumed: xi=xj = (pi=pj)
1
 1. Substituting
this relationship back into the budget constraint gives the demand stated.
Derivation of equation 3: From the derivative of the solution for xi with
















Given the assumption that the number of ￿rms is large, the second term
in this equation can be dropped. This simpli￿cation has attracted quite some
controversy in the literature, 5 and I do acknowledge that the results only holds
if the number of ￿rms is large (assumption four). Then from the Lerner pricing
condition given the price elasticity i =   1
1  follows the price setting equation
stated.
Derivation of equation 4: Since initially all ￿rms have identical ￿xed and
marginal costs c and f, they all charge the same prices p = c= and produce
the same quantity x, which equals:
5See for example the critical comments by Yang and Heijdra [1993], or d’Aspremont et al.












Pro￿ts are then given by  = xp xc f = xp(1 ) f = (1 )I=n f,
and since they have to be zero the number of ￿rms n can be determined from
this last equation.
Derivation of equation 5: Using equation 2 and 3 the pro￿t in a single
period can be calculated. I assume that the ￿xed and marginal costs have to be
paid in the second period also, but the research costs only in the ￿rst period.
To account for this time asymmetry I discount the transfers that occur in the
second period by interest rate r, such that an amount of a in 1 period is of
current value a=(1 + r). Then pro￿ts of a ￿rm in the period after innovation
from perspective of the date when the investment decision has to be made can














































The second order condition of problem 6
Writing W = V + c(!i)

 1 as the total innovation index, the second order































After deriving the second order condition, the symmetry condition can be














(n1   1)(n1   2)
(1   )n3
1c(!)2 < 0:
This is ful￿lled provided the conditions stated on the cost function and the
number of ￿rms hold.
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Figure 1: Profits of one firm taking the behavior of other firms as constant. The following
parameters are assumed: θ =3 / 4 ,I( 1-θ) = 100, a value for the innovation index of the other
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Figure 2: The research effort of an innovative firm as function of market competition. The
following parameters are assumed: I is given by 1500, 1000 and 500 (from top to bottom), f is
given by 100. Interest rate r is given by 0.05. Values for which either of conditions 11, 12 or 13 are
not fulfilled are excluded from the representation.






























Figure 3: The research effort of an innovative firm as function of market competition. The
following parameters are assumed: I is given by 1000, f is (from highest to lowest maximum): 10,
100 and 200. Interest rate r is given by 0.05. Values for which either of conditions 11, 12 or 13 are
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Figure 4: The research effort of all firms as a function of θ. The following parameters are assumed:  
m=1000, f=100 and r=0.05.  Parameters for which the parametric conditions are not fulfilled are 
































Figure 5:  The research effort of one firm varying with fixed costs f.  I is assumed to be 1000, r is 5 
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